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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is authorized by Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) Utah Code 
Annotated, as amended in 1992 and by Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court properly determined that when 
Donna Watts' purported second marriage was annulled, the marriage 
was void ab initio and therefore, for the purposes of the 
language of the Decree, to which the husband agreed, no 
"marriage" had taken place. The standard of review is that 
applied to matters of contract interpretation. This is a 
question of applying a given set of facts to the terms of a court 
order and the court grants no deference to the trial court's 
determination. Hadow v. Hadow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). 
2. Whether the trial court properly determined that an 
agreed upon division of property cannot be modified simply 
because one party to the agreement subsequently decides the 
agreement is inequitable. This is a question of applying a given 
set of facts to a determined legal standard and the court grants 
no deference to the trial court's determination. Hadow v. Hadow. 
707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). 
3. Whether the trial court properly determined that a 
division of property is not analogous to the payment of alimony 
for purposes of the application of Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(5). 
This question of the construction of a statute is purely a 
question of law for which no deference is given to the lower 
court. Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City, 572 P.2d 884 
(Utah 1988) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Section 3 0-1-2 of the Utah Code provides in part that 
The following marriages are prohibited and declared 
void: 
... 
(2) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom 
the person marrying has not been divorced; 
... 
(5) between a divorced person and any person other than 
the one from whom the marriage was secured until the 
divorce decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is 
taken, until after the affirmance of the decree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On April 20, 1983, Plaintiff-Appellee Donna Watts ("Donna") 
was granted a default divorce from her husband Defendant-
Appellant Wesley Watts (the "Husband") pursuant to a Decree of 
Divorce (the "Decree"). R. 18-20.1 The present proceeding was 
initiated by the Husband. He filed an Order to Show Cause 
seeking to hold Donna in contempt for not paying him $24,000. 
He claimed this payment was required by the Decree. R. 38-39. 
The Husband also filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree 
seeking to modify the Decree to require that Donna pay him 
$24,000 within sixty days. R. 29-32. The Husband claimed in 
1 R
* P* _• will designate the page number of the Record on 
Appeal on which support for the preceding facts may be found. 
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his Order to Show Cause and Petition to Modify the Decree that 
the Decree required Donna to pay him $24,000 within six years of 
her remarriage. R. 29 & 36. He claimed this condition was 
satisfied by a purported marriage Donna had entered into with 
Denna Landon Scott ("Scott"). R. 29-30 & 33. This marriage had 
been annulled and adjudged void ab initio. R. 50-51. 
On October 30, 1992, following a hearing, the Third District 
Court Domestic Relations Commissioner recommended that the 
Husband's motions for contempt and for an order requiring payment 
of $24,000 be denied on the grounds that the money was not due 
since the remarriage to Scott had been declared null and void. 
R. 56-57. The Husband filed an objection to this recommendation 
with Third District Judge J. Dennis Frederick. R. 76-79. The 
objection filed by the Husband was untimely being filed beyond 
the ten day limit established by Rule 6-204 (4) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. Judge Frederick accepted the 
Commissioner's recommendation and entered an order reflecting the 
recommendation on November 23, 1992. R. 8 0-81. 
Statement of Facts 
In 1983 Donna sought a divorce from the Husband. The 
divorce was not contested. R. 2-6. Donna and the Husband agreed 
to the terms upon which the divorce would be granted including 
the division of the marital property. R. 8-9. The Husband 
agreed that Donna, as part of the division of property, would 
keep the marital residence. R. 3 & 8. As his portion of the 
equity in the residence, the Husband agreed to accept the sum of 
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$24,000.00. The Husband also agreed that Donna would only be 
obligated to pay this amount upon the occurrence of one of two 
conditions. The Husband agreed that Donna would not have to pay 
the $24,000.00 until the house was sold or six years after Donna 
remarried. R. 3 & 8. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree incorporated this agreement between Donna and 
the Husband. R. 16 & 19. 
On August 8, 1986, Donna thought she married Denna Landon 
Scott. R. 58 3. Before the purported marriage, Scott disclosed 
that he had been married previously but that marriage had ended 
in divorce. R. 47. A few weeks after the marriage, however, 
Donna discovered that the divorce had never been finalized. R. 
58. She determined that Scott was legally incapable of being 
married because he was already married to another woman. On 
October , 1986, shortly after her discovery, Donna filed an 
action to have her "marriage" to Scott annulled because Scott was 
legally incapable of being married. R. 62-65. Donna also sought 
a restraining order restraining Scott from, among other things, 
entering into her home or place of business. R. 67-68. The 
restraining order was granted for the pendency of the annulment 
action and Scott was prohibited from entering Donna,s home or 
place of business and from molesting, abusing and physical, 
touching Donna. R.68-69. 
Donna was also successful in the annulment action. The 
court found that Scott had been married at the time he attempted 
to marry Donna and concluded that the purported marriage to Scott 
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was void. R. 47-48. Donna's "marriage" to Scott was annulled by 
order of the Third Judicial District Court on October 20, 1987. 
R. 50-51. The Husband was informed of the annulment proceeding 
at the time it occurred. R. 59. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Donna's prior marriage to Scott was annulled meaning 
that it was declared void ab initio. The effect of an annulment 
is to treat the marriage as if it had never occurred. If the 
marriage is treated legally as if it had never occurred, it 
cannot be the basis for triggering a duty to make payments under 
a prior divorce decree. 
2. The Decree reflects the agreement of the parties 
concerning the division of the property of the parties7 marriage. 
The division of property to which the Husband assented cannot be 
changed by the court simply because the Husband now thinks the 
agreement is not fair. Equity is not available to the Husband to 
alter the terms of his agreement simply because he is unhappy 
with it. 
The Husband's complaint seeking to modify the divorce decree 
was properly dismissed because he alleged no changed 
circumstances supporting his request to modify the Decree. 
Although the courts do retain jurisdiction to modify decrees, the 
power to do so is limited to situations in which there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances. When one party seeks to 
change an agreed-to property division the courts should make a 
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change only if the substantial change demonstrates compelling 
reasons for making the modification. The Husband's complaint 
seeking modification was therefore legally insufficient since it 
claimed no changed circumstances, only the fulfillment of one of 
the conditions of the Decree, 
3. A division of property is not an award of alimony and 
should not be treated as such. The Utah statutes respecting 
alimony and annulments clearly apply only to alimony, not to 
agreed upon property divisions. There is no rational basis on 
which to claim that an agreed upon property division is analogous 
to the payment of alimony. The provisions of the Decree should 
not, therefore, be treated like an order to pay alimony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A MARRIAGE DECLARED TO BE VOID CANNOT BE THE TRIGGERING 
EVENT FOR A DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
The Husband wants Donna to pay him $24,000 because, he says, 
the Decree requires it. The Decree provides that Donna is to pay 
this sum six years after she remarries. The initial question to 
be asked is whether Donna remarried more than six years ago. The 
answer to that question is no she did not. The law in Utah 
concerning annulled marriages is quite clear. fl[I]n the case of 
an annulment, the judgment is that there was never a valid 
marriage." Cecil v. Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 158, 356 P.2d 279 
(1960). That is the marriage is treated as void. Section 30-1-2 
of the Utah Code provides that 
The following marriages are prohibited and declared 
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void: 
(2) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom 
the person marrying has not been divorced; 
• • • 
(5) between a divorced person and any person other than 
the one from whom the marriage was secured until the 
divorce decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is 
taken, until after the affirmance of the decree. 
Donna's purported marriage to Scott was annulled as a 
violation of Utah law and was declared void ab initio. It was 
treated as if it had never taken place. This is the proper 
treatment of an annulled marriage. If the marriage never 
happened, there was no event to trigger the requirement to pay 
$24,000 to the Husband. 
The Husband acknowledges this treatment of an annulled 
marriage by not challenging the decision of the court below on 
these grounds. The Husband argues exclusively that the court 
should have modified the Decree to require Donna to pay him 
$24,000 thus tacitly acknowledging that under the Decree as 
presently written, no obligation to pay the $24,000 exists. The 
decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
II. THE PROPERTY DIVISION DONNA AND THE HUSBAND AGREED TO 
CANNOT BE ALTERED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE HUSBAND IS NOW UNWILLING TO 
ABIDE BY ITS TERMS 
Since it is clear that under the terms of the Decree as 
written, Donna need not pay the money requested by the Husband, 
the Husband wants the court to change the language of the Decree. 
He seeks to do so either because the Decree is inequitable or 
because circumstances have changed. Neither of these rationale 
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support the Husband's contention. 
The same arguments asserted by the Husband in this case were 
considered and rejected by this Court in Whitehouse v. 
Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah App. 1990). In Whitehouse, the 
divorcing parties had agreed to language which gave the husband a 
conditional equity interest in the marital home provided the wife 
sold the home or remarried within 7 1/2 years from the entry of 
the decree of divorce. The husband in that case asked the court 
to change the decree to provide that the equity in the home would 
be due and payable when the wife remarried, sold the home, or 7 
1/2 years from the date of the decree, whichever came first. The 
lower court agreed and changed the decree. 
This court reviewed that decision and reversed. In its 
decision, this court addressed the contention made here that the 
provision of the decree was inequitable and therefore should be 
changed. This court noted in Whitehouse that "equity should not 
be used as a lever to realign rights and privileges ^voluntarily 
contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain 
made.' Whitehouse at 61, quoting Lea v. Bowersf 658 P.2d 1213, 
1215 (Utah 1983), quoting, Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 
(Utah 1980). 
In this case the Husband and Donna both agreed that the 
Husband's equity interest in the home would "be paid to him w} ^ n 
the home is sold or six years after the Plaintiff remarries." 
The Husband now claims that leaving this language in the Decree 
is inequitable and wants the language changed. The situation is 
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precisely that addressed by this court in Whitehouse and the 
result should be the same. The parties agreed to the property 
division. The Husband's claim that the agreement he struck is 
not equitable is simply not sufficient to disturb that agreement. 
As in Whitehouse, the Husband here has also claimed that the 
Decree should be modified. He points out, correctly, that the 
court maintains jurisdiction over actions such as this in order 
to make continuing adjustments to the decree as the need arises. 
However, the power of the court to change the Decree is strictly 
limited. A decree may only be modified when there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances. What's more if the 
modification sought relates to an agreed upon division of 
property, as is the case here, the party seeking modification 
must demonstrate "compelling reasons arising from a substantial 
and material change in circumstances." Whitehouse at 61, quoting 
Foulger v. Foulaer, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). The Husband 
instead alleged no change of circumstances at all. There is not 
one word in the Husband's petition which relates to how the 
parties' circumstances may differ now from when the divorce was 
finalized. 
In support of his argument the Husband cites a number of 
cases from surrounding jurisdictions because, as he admits, there 
is no Utah case law which supports his argument. Thus the 
Husband relies on Koelsch v. Koelsch, 713 P.2d 1234 (Ariz. 1986); 
Hardin v. Hardin, 788 P.2d 1252 (Ariz. App. 1990); and Chrane v. 
Chrane, 649 P.2d 1384 (N.M. 1982). None of these cases is 
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applicable to the issue at hand because in all of these cases the 
courts were addressing decrees which had been imposed upon the 
parties by the court after litigation of the matters. Thus in 
each of these cases when the appeals courts examined the equities 
of the decrees the courts were adjudging the propriety of the 
actions of the trial court. In this case the parties themselves 
agreed to the provisions of the Decree and this court has 
emphatically stated that it will not look behind such an 
agreement of the parties. 
Thus the Husband has not even alleged the minimum facts 
required for a modification of a decree much less facts which 
show compelling reasons for a modification arising from a 
substantial an material change of circumstances. Under the 
Whitehouse case, the order of the court below must be upheld. 
III. THE DIVISION OF PROPERTY AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS NOT 
ANALOGOUS TO THE PROVISION OF ALIMONY 
The Husband has maintained that the circumstances 
surrounding the annulment of Donna's prior "marriage" should be 
treated as if the issue were the continuation of alimony under 
Utah Code Ann. 30-3-5(5). There is, however, no basis for 
treating an award of alimony the same as an order of property 
division and the Husband gives no reasons why they should be 
treated the same. Indeed, as has been indicated above, the 
statutory approach is to make the alteration of an agreed upon 
property settlement much more difficult than the alteration of 
the payment of alimony. 
Section 30-3-5(5) applies to alimony only. If the 
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legislature had intended that the section apply to property 
divisions it could cerrainly have so provided. Absent the 
legislative application and any reasons why the two events should 
be treated the same in the event of an annulment, the statute 
must have no application in this instance. The order of the 
District Court should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Donna's annulled marriage to Scott cannot be used as the 
basis for requiring Donna to pay the Husband money the Decree 
declares to be due after Donna's remarriage. The Husband tacitly 
acknowledges this by arguing that the Decree must be changed to 
require Donna to make the $24,000 payment. However, the Husband 
has presented no grounds upon which the Decree can or should be 
modified. The order of the court below should be upheld in all 
respects. 
DATED this //^> day of July, 1993. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
KING & ISAACSON, P.C. 
\J/IJY+^~ & 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/AppejLlee 
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